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Abstract. Birthday Paradox states that in a group of 23 people, the
probability that there are at least two who share the same birthday
is very close to 1
2
. This assertion is unacceptable for any scheme that
proposes a vote storage method based on a vector of slots whose position
is chosen at random. In this situation, it may produce collisions.
A collision occurs when two or more votes are stored in the same slot.
It produces the loss of the coincident votes. This is the original model of
the Non - Interactive Dining Cryptographers (NIDC) protocol.
The actual paper shows new achieved results obtained by analyzing the
behaviour of a storage technique based on parallel channels. This scheme
consists of replicating each vote in Q parallel channels, keeping the total
number of slots (T ) without variation.
Keywords: Parallel Channels, Storage Birthday Paradox, Non - Inter-
active Dining Cryptographers, Collisions.
1 Introduction
Within the scope of a research line that began at 2013 and which was formally
presented in [1], the exact security level requested for anonymity in an electronic
voting scheme was analyzed. Many of the proposed schemes (Mix Net based) give
unconditional security to the votes’ information and computational assurance to
voter’s privacy. However, it is easy to see that it is an erroneous proposal . In [2]
it is concluded that it is necessary to give unconditional security for the privacy,
because it must be protected indefinitely. Otherwise, votes must be kept for a
finite period of time.
Consequently, those schemes, that include unconditional security as the main
feature, acquire maximun interest. In this sense, one of the most interesting is
Dinning Cryptographers (DC), which is described in detail in [3]. This protocol
is resourceful and gives unconditional privacy.
The analysis is focused on a derivative of DC, called Non Interactive Dining
Cryptographers (NIDC [4]), that relaxes the condition of concurrency online
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2for all participants. This protocol is suitable to be applied to electronic voting
scheme.
The original version of NIDC, stores data in a vector of slots. This is observed
in figure 1.
Fig. 1. Original NIDC Storage
If two or more votes are stored in the same slot, a collision occurs. That
results in the loss of coincident votes. Simultaneously, the proposition of true
randomness for the choice of position indicates that collisions may happen. It
then seeks to ensure that the proportion of lost data is kept below a desired value
with a certain probability. The proposed model in Figure 1 may be explained
by Birthday Paradox ([5]). In those conditions, it is required a very significant
number of slots to obtain suitable security levels.
Two interesting alternatives, aimed at improving the Birthday Paradox effect
are presented in [6]. In that document an optimization for NIDC, applying mul-
tiple networks in serie and in parallel, is proposed. In this case, however, it seeks
to generalize the approach to storage in parallel channels, a matter that may
be generalized to multiple real-world problems, including NIDC. The alternative
proposal consists on implementing N parallel channels, replicating each vote in
all channels, in potentially different random positions in each case, as outlined
in Figure 2.
It begins by describing the parameters involved:
T : # Total slots to implement. T ∈ Z+.
S: # Parallel slots on each channel. S ∈ Z+ ∧ S ≤ T .
N : # Voters. N ∈ Z+.
Q: # Parallel channels to implement. Q ∈ Z+.
Qto: # Parallel channels to implement (Theorically Optimal). Qto ∈ R+.
Qpo: # Parallel channels to implement (Practically Optimal). Qpo ∈ Z+.
R: # Replicas of a vote on the same channel. R ∈ Z+.
PLV : Percentage of Lost Votes.
Throughout previous papers ([7], [8] and [9]) the following relevant findings
have been set forth (in adition, function CEIL will be used; it computes the
nearest higher integer. That is necessary because Qto could be non integer):
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3Fig. 2. Scheme based on Parallel Channels
– For a fixed number of voters N , the recommended number of slots for each
parallel channel (S) is given by the formula:
S = CEIL(
N
ln2
) (1)
– For given values of T and N , there exists an optimal number of parallel
channels. Such value is expressed:
Qto = ln2
T
N
(2)
That formula should be taken to the next integer.
Qpo = CEIL(Qto) (3)
– An appropriate lower bound for the probability of X = ”no vote is lost” is
obtained by applying equation:
Pr(X) > (1− (1
s
(n− 1))q)n (4)
Besides, concrete methods were published to obtain optimal values for all pa-
rameters using a spreadsheet ([10]) and the pseudocode algorithm that must be
applied for the same purpose was shown in [11].
In this document the variable PLV is analyzed. One equation is described
to get an approximation of the expected value of that variable. The following
section describes the deduction of such formula .
2 Expected Value of Percentage of Lost Votes (PLV )
By applying a parallel channels scheme, a question that quickly arises is: for a
situation with N voters, and Q parallel channels of S slots (such that T = SQ),
which is the expected Percentage of Lost Votes (PLV )?
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4At the beginnig, it is considered the original Birthday Paradox proposal.
The first thing we see is that even in the best case (the 23 people Birthdays on
different dates), the number of slots that will not be used is 342, then we have
approximately 6,3 % of occupied slots and 93,7 % of empty slots. Consequently,
for each slot containing a vote, more than 15 receive no ballots.
The proposal is to divide all the slots in Q > 1 parallel channels and to
deposit an occurrence of each vote in each of the channels. In addition to what
appeared in the simulations, the idea is related to the fact that a vote is lost on
a given channel is independent of what happens in the other Q− 1 channels.
Independent events verify that:
Pr(A ∩B) = Pr(A)Pr(B) (5)
Clearly a vote will be lost only if it collides on all the channels. The number of
local collisions increases, since each channel will have a measure smaller than
the single vector. However, an optimization based on replicas is obtained.
Let ε be:
ε =
N
S
(6)
Initially the situation is analyzed if a single vector is implemented, therefore, S
= T .
Several strategies based on analyzing the probability distribution are pre-
sented in [12]. Also, the approaches proposed by Feller [13], were mentioned.
These approaches improve their behaviour when N →∞ y T →∞. A tool that
may be useful is Stirling’s approximation for calculating factorials:
N ! =
√
2ΠN(
X
N
)N (7)
It is proposed another approach, which is simpler than the previous one because
it only calculates expected values rather than probability distribution.
Considering the first vote, the probability that it falls into the slot 1 is:
p =
1
S
(8)
Consequently, the probability that it does not fall into the slot 1 is:
q = 1− p = (1− 1
S
) (9)
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5Generalizing to N votes, we get a binomial distribution with parameters N and
p.
Let Xk be: ”Exactly k votes are stored in slot 1” with k ∈ Z+
Pr(Xk) =
(
N
k
)
pkqN−k (10)
Pr(Xk) =
(
N
k
)
(
1
S
)k(1− 1
S
)N−k (11)
Given that:
lim
x→∞ (1 +
1
n
)n = e (12)
We can assure:
Pr(X0) = (1− 1S )N ≈ e−ε
Pr(X1) = N
1
S (1− 1S )N−1 ≈ εe−ε
Pr(X2) =
N(N−1)
2 (
1
S )
2(1− 1S )N−2 ≈ 12ε2e−ε
These probabilities also represent the expected number of votes in slot 1. It
is obvious that the same reasoning can be applied to any slot. Therefore, it is
possible to find the expected frequency.
Given that limx→∞ (1 + 1n )
n = e, for N = S = 1000, ε = 1. Therefore:
Pr(X0) = Pr(X1) = e
−1 ≈ 0.3678 (13)
Similarly, for N = 500, S = 1000, ε = 12 , in which case:
Pr(X0) = e
− 12 ≈ 0.6065
Pr(X1) =
1
2e
− 12 ≈ 0.3032
Let E(k) be: #expected slots containing k votes. Its value is obtained as follows:
E(k) = Sp(Xk) (14)
This fits together with the Poisson approximation stated in [15 ] :
E(Poisson(λ)] = λ (15)
λ[X0] = Se
−NS (16)
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6For k = 1:
λ[X1] =
(ne
−r
n )
k!
(
r
n
)k =
Se(−ε)
k!
ε = Sεe−ε (17)
For k = 2:
λ[X2] =
ne(
−r
n )
k!
(
r
n
)k =
Se−ε
2
ε2 = Sε2e−ε (18)
The Poisson approximation improves its quality when S →∞ and N →∞. The
previous formula is related to S. It is more interesting yet, to obtain a connection
with the number of successful votes, ie for k = 1 , E(1) is divided into N and it
is obtained:
Sεe−ε
N
= e−ε (19)
It is possible to generalize the approach to Q channels , with Q > 1. For example,
for S = N = 1000:
s[1] = 1000e−1 ≈ 368 (20)
Consequently, for Q = 1:
Pr(successfulvote) ≈ 0.36 (21)
Pr(lostvote) ≈ 1− 0.36 = 0.64 (22)
For Q = 2, one vote is lost if collides in the two channels:
Pr(successfulvote) = 1− 0.39 ≈ 0.61 (23)
Pr(lostvote) = 0.642 ≈ 0.39 (24)
The same scheme is generalized ∀Q > 2. Thus it is obtained a formula to calcu-
late the expected value of the variable Percentage of Lost Votes.
| PLV |= (1− e−ns )q (25)
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72.1 Practical Verification of the Proposed Formula
Given formulas above, a simulator has been implemented which two main aims:
1. To verify the correctness of formulas.
2. To bear out that the approach of storing in parallel channels optimizes the
results in terms of several variables which may be considered.
The simulator is implemented allowing the following inputs:
1. Total number of slots to implement (T ).
2. Number f voters (N).
3. Quantity of parallel channels to implement (Q).
4. Quantity of election acts that will be simulated by session (R).
The simulator verifies that the total number of slots (T ) is a multiple of
quantity of parallel channel, because the quantity of slots in each channel (S)
must be an integer number.
When the simulation is complete, the following information may be obtained:
1. Total of successful votes (SV ).
2. Total of lost votes (LV ).
3. Quantity of runs where at least one vote is lost (R)
4. Quantity of runs (Votings) without lost votes (RWLV )
5. Quantity of runs (Votings) with lost votes (RLV )
6. Best case, that is to say, how many votes were lost in the most successful
run (BC).
7. Worst case, that is to say, how many votes were lost in the less successful
run (WC).
Therefore, we will observe the behaviour of the formula (25) based on the
next ratio:
SPLV =
LV
SV + LV
(26)
Table 1 shows the values that were obtained in different simulations and the
difference between those and the analytical results obtained by application of
equation (25). With this purpose, the following variables are introduced:
– FV : Values obtained by application of formula (25).
– SV : Values obtained by simulation.
Watching the values of Table 1, the difference between FV and SV remains
at very low values. Specifically:
– The maximum one is 0,002452561.
– The minimum one is 2,80437E-07.
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8N T S Q FV SV DIFFERENCE
15 150 15 10 0,010185894 0,008466667 0,001719227
15 300 30 10 8,89424E-05 0 8,89424E-05
15 450 45 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
15 600 60 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
30 300 30 10 0,010185894 0,007733333 0,002452561
30 600 60 10 8,89424E-05 0 8,89424E-05
30 900 90 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
30 1200 120 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
60 600 60 10 0,010185894 0,0098 0,000385894
60 1200 120 10 8,89424E-05 0,00015 -6,10576E-05
60 1800 180 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
60 2400 240 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
120 1200 120 10 0,010185894 0,012025 -0,001839106
120 2400 240 10 8,89424E-05 0 8,89424E-05
120 3600 360 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
120 4800 480 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
240 2400 240 10 0,010185894 0,009129167 0,001056727
240 4800 480 10 8,89424E-05 0 8,89424E-05
240 7200 720 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
240 9600 960 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
360 3600 360 10 0,010185894 0,008391667 0,001794227
360 7200 720 10 8,89424E-05 1,11E-05 7,78313E-05
360 10800 1080 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
360 14400 1440 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
480 4800 480 10 0,010185894 0,00988125 0,000304644
480 9600 960 10 8,89424E-05 0 8,89424E-05
480 14400 1440 10 3,35005E-06 0 3,35005E-06
480 19200 1920 10 2,80437E-07 0 2,80437E-07
Table 1. Difference between FV and SV
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9– The average value is: 0,000227181
Another aspect which should be highlighted is that the formula (25) works
better when N < S. As both values approach, the behaviour is worse. For
example, Figure 3 shows the values of FV and SV with de following values for
the parameters:
– N = (7..15)
– T = 150
– Q = 10
– S = 15
Fig. 3. PLV : Difference Between FV AND SV
3 Conclusions
The approach based on parallel channels optimizes the use of storage space
intended to store data whose location is truly random. The formulas (1), (2),
(3), (4) y (25) accurately describe the behaviour of the model.
Specifically, the results obtained by the formula (25) are very close to the
values obtained in the simulations, though the difference increases when N is
close to S. Even in that case, the behaviour of the formula is acceptable.
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